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All the recent posts on this site with comments have been exported to the new site.
Please start posting there as I have disabled comments here.
We are still working on recovering all old posts and comments and will have them up soon.
Bloomberg reports that —
U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said yesterday the group behind last week’s assault also carried out a 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, which authorities blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba. He didn’t mention the group by name.
It also goes on to talk about the well-known historical relationship between the LeT and the ISI.
An investigation of Lashkar may lead to the Pakistan army’s main intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, because the ISI gave money and direction to the Islamist group as it conducted attacks in India in the 1990s, according to Husain Haqqani, a Boston University professor who is now Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington.
While most people in India perceive LeT as a terrorist group based in Pakistan, it is much more than that. Steve Coll recounts his personal experiences to decipher the reach of the LeT and its charity, Jamat-ed-Dawa, in The New Yorker —
Late in 2005, I travelled for The New Yorker to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to report on the earthquake that devastated the region. To facilitate international aid, the Pakistani government opened the region to journalists, creating a very rare opportunity to travel without escort and to poke around on the border. I was particularly interested in looking up Lashkar, which I had been following for many years. I made several visits to facilities run by its charity, called “Jamat-ud-Dawa,” which is today tolerated openly by the government of Pakistan but banned as a terrorist organization by the United States on the grounds that it is merely an alias for Lashkar.
In Muzuffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir, Jamat had brought in a mobile surgical unit staffed by long-bearded doctors from Karachi and Lahore—very impressive young men, fluent in English, who offered a reminder that unlike, say, the Taliban, Lashkar draws some very talented people from urban professions. (With its hospitals, universities, and social-service wings, Lashkar is akin to Hezbollah or Hamas; it is a three-dimensional political and social movement with an armed wing, not merely a terrorist or paramilitary outfit.) As part of its earthquake relief work, Lashkar ferried supplies to remote villages isolated on the far side of the churning Neelum River, one of the two snow-fed canyon rivers that traverse the area. I asked to take a ride with its volunteers, and their media officer (yes, they have media officers) agreed.
We rode in a van to the river’s edge, scrambled down a rocky hillside and boarded one of Lashkar’s rubber pontoon boats, about fifteen feet long, with a large outboard motor—useful for carrying relief supplies, but not coincidentally, also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian-held Kashmir. It has long been an open secret, and a source of some hilarity among foreign correspondents, that under the guise of “humanitarian relief operations,” Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. The events in Mumbai have taken the humor of these “humanitarian” rehearsals away. That day on the Neelum, I chatted with our thick-bearded captain in my very poor Arabic. He spoke Arabic as well—from his religious studies, he said, although he conceded, too, that he had travelled to Saudi Arabia, where it is well understood that Lashkar has raised money. I was also told that around the time of the earthquake they set up fund-raising operations in Britain, to tap the Pakistani diaspora there.
Earlier this year, I met with a Lashkar official in Lahore. We talked about how Jamat was getting along under international pressure. I took no notes and the conversation was intended for my informal guidance, but I came away with a number of impressions. On the one hand, the group’s bank accounts remain unmolested by the Pakistani government, which gives Lashkar quite a lot of running room; on the other, the group resents the accommodations reached between Pakistan’s government and the United States. Clearly, Lashkar knows what it must do to protect the Pakistan government from being exposed in the violent operations that Lashkar runs in Kashmir and elsewhere. For example, some of its younger volunteers wanted to join the fight with the Taliban in Western Pakistan and Afghanistan, my interlocutor said, and so Jamat had evolved an internal H.R. policy by which these young men would turn in their Jamat identity cards and go West “on their own time,” much as think tanks allow policy scholars to take leaves of absence to advise political campaigns.
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online’s Pakistan Bureau Chief, portrays a conspiracy theory which believes that “several things went wrong within the ISI, which resulted in the Mumbai attacks”.
A plan by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that had been in the pipelines for several months – even though official policy was to ditch it – saw what was to be a low-profile attack in Kashmir turn into the massive attacks on Mumbai last week. The original plan was highjacked by the Laskar-e-Taiba (LET), a Pakistani militant group that generally focussed on the Kashmir struggle, and al-Qaeda, resulting in the deaths of nearly 200 people in Mumbai.
…Under directives from Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kiani, who was then director general (DG) of the ISI, a low-profile plan was prepared to support Kashmiri militancy. That was normal, even in light of the peace process with India. Although Pakistan had closed down its major operations, it still provided some support to the militants so that the Kashmiri movement would not die down completely.
After Kiani was promoted to chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj was placed as DG of the ISI. The external section under him routinely executed the plan of Kiani and trained a few dozen LET militants near Mangla Dam (near the capital Islamabad). They were sent by sea to Gujrat, from where they had to travel to Kashmir to carry out operations.
Meanwhile, a major reshuffle in the ISI two months ago officially shelved this low-key plan as the country’s whole focus had shifted towards Pakistan’s tribal areas. The director of the external wing was also changed, placing the “game” in the hands of a low-level ISI forward section head (a major) and the LET’s commander-in-chief, Zakiur Rahman.
Zakiur was in Karachi for two months to personally oversee the plan. However, the militant networks in India and Bangladesh comprising the Harkat, which were now in al-Qaeda’s hands, tailored some changes. Instead of Kashmir, they planned to attack Mumbai, using their existent local networks, with Westerners and the Jewish community center as targets.
Zakiur and the ISI’s forward section in Karachi, completely disconnected from the top brass, approved the plan under which more than 10 men took Mumbai hostage for nearly three days and successfully established a reign of terror.
Indian authorities will be able to easily establish the role of the LeT and consequently, the ISI and the Pakistani army in perpetuating these terror attacks at Mumbai. The blasts at Indian embassy in Kabul had also shown that the ISI was behind them, as shown by the US intelligence agencies. Many in this country do not tire of portraying Mumbai terror attack as a watershed in India’s history, whereas the real watershed should have been the Kabul blasts. Why didn’t we move against the ISI and Pakistani state then, when we had the proof?
Although he has no control over the Pakistani army and the ISI, mealy-mouthed Zardari has already started backpedalling furiously.
Zardari also suggested no one found to be involved would be turned over to India.
“If we had the proof, we would try them in our courts, we would try them in our land and we would sentence them,” he said.
Mizoram a tiny state to the North East went polls yesterday to record a turnout of over 74%.
In Delhi which went to polls on saturday over 60% turned out to vote, a record turnout in stark contrast to the dismal turnout in earlier local body elections and the 2003 assembly elections.
Madhya Pradesh which went to polls as news of the terrorist attack on Mumbai trickled registered a record 69.3% turnout.
Jammu & Kashmir which just concluded the 3rd phase of polling recorded 62% turnout.
Irrespective of their political affiliations Indians across the country have sent one message to the terrorists who struck Mumbai and to their sponsors in undemocratic Pakistan a resounding message by reposing their faith in India’s Democracy.
Now it appears that a small but vocal minority from the usually non-voting upper middle class with its conscience perked over the failure of the State in response to the War on Mumbai have come up with a quixotic campaign called “Don’t Vote 2009“.
So the brightest idea these dim-wits could come up with to fix accountability of the political leadership is to basically leave the contest to lobbies and pressure groups to elect their favorites while the common man in their opinion should just sit out.
The utter naivety of this campaign apart, it raises serious constitutional questions of voter intimidation.
It is this defeatist mindset of the upper middle class which as at the heart of the current political culture.
Having sat out of previous elections with similar attitude this section of the urban middle class has done precious little to exercise its influence over the political process. When it did choose to engage the politicians it was to patronise a political culture that curries political favor through connections and nepotism.
Having never seriously engaged the mainstream political parties by making their votes count, these dim-wits now want to mislead the Youth of India and First Time Voters into believing that the smartest thing to do to clean up the political system is to somehow turn your back on the very process that makes politicians accountable.
But here is what makes this so called Dont Vote Campaign an act of treason.
It basically sends a message to the Terrorists who struck Mumbai and to their sponsors in Pakistan that they were right to strike at our democracy and our way of life for that Democracy is not worth fighting for and defending. They want to send the message to the Terrorists that this democracy is so dispirting that one is better off sitting out of the very process of elections that makes it work rather than get engaged to make it accountable and effective.
A Vote not Cast is a Vote in support of the Terrorists
In a year when evern Kashmiris have opted for the Ballot over Bullets, a Dont Vote Campaign championed by educated upper middle class voters of Mumbai is not just foolish and misguided but actually dangerous.
India’s War on Terror is not merely a fight against terrorists but it is a fight to defend our democracy and our way of life. That War cannot be won by sitting out of elections.
If you are disappointed with the current class of politicians then get engaged in the political process. If you dont have it in you to participate in the political process then atleast rally behind those who can.
But for godssake dont allow your defeatist mindset to prejudice the youth and first time voters against exercising their franchise.
The December 2008 issue of Pragati is now available. (2.5 MB PDF)
Earlier this year, in the wake of the terrorist attacks by the ‘Indian Mujahideen’, Pragati had argued that war has already been declared on us, that it is necessary to recognise it for what it is, and prepare the nation to confront it. Unfortunately, even as the political class tied itself into knots while playing to its numerous partisan interests, India’s enemies planned and pulled off an attack that will have far-reaching consequences not just for us, but for the whole world. Even before these attacks, we had intended to focus the December 2008 issue on domestic aspects of counter-terrorism policy. So this issue covers both the geopolitical and internal security dimensions of India’s strategic response to terrorism.
In addition to this, you’ll find in this issue articles examining how India could make the most out of the India-US nuclear deal and the NSG waiver; taking stock of Bangladeshi politics as it prepares to return to representative government; and a review of two recent books on Pakistan since 2001.
Read, share and encourage your friends to sign-up.
NB: Pragati and the Indian National Interest blogs outgrew their website hosting providers ability to support us. We are moving to a new service provider. Business as usual is expected to resume on 5th December.
Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review
Issue 21 – December 2008
Retaliation, punishment, deterrence
The external and internal dimensions of India’s response
The elusive national counter-terrorism policy
A problem of political vision, federal structure & the nature of the threat
Ajit Kumar Doval
Don’t blame the constitution
The central government is not impaired from acting against terrorism
India-US relations under the new administration
The problem is in Pakistan, not Kashmir
The “solve Kashmir to solve Afghanistan” is an old red herring
Sushant K Singh
Joining the nuclear renaissance
How it looks to a man from Mars
On using the final argument
Cultivating the diplomacy of violence
Harsh V Pant
A quiet arrangement in the Middle East
Sushant K Singh
Another restoration of democracy
Towards meaningful democracy or back to confrontational politics
State of the FATWAT
How Pakistan has fared as a Frontline Ally in The War Against Terror
From Strategic Communication: A Primer [pdf]–
We typically design physical operations first, then craft supporting information operations to explain our actions. This is the reverse of al-Qaida’s approach. For all our professionalism, compared to the enemy’s, our public information is an afterthought. In military terms, for al-Qaida the ‘main effort’ is information; for us, information is a ‘supporting effort’.
~David Kilcullen, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict
The physical operations in Mumbai might have ended after 60 hours of gunfights. But is India geared up to undertake sustained and proactive information operations against the enemy. It is the question that the Indian establishment needs to answer, when the media and the establishment — politicians, bureaucrats, corporates and even generals — feed off each other in an incestuous and self-serving relationship.
Perhaps it is time that the common man, more than the Indian state, also took a fresh look at the role and responsibility of the Indian media — print, electronic and new age. This consideration will be the key battle-winning-factor in winning this asymmetric war launched against Indians and the Indian state. Ponder!
For days we have been debating on what the strategic response ought to be to the War on Mumbai. While broad contours have been emerging in the media, it is far from clear what would be the most effective strategy and if the present Government has the will and the wherewithall to follow through on such a strategy.
Factors to be considered
Any strategy we come up with must factor the following:
– there is more than one and maybe upto 4 competing interests in Pakistan and hence it does not make sense to have a single Pakistan strategy but multiple sub-strategies to engage or deal with each of these competing interests
– most of these competing interests can get behind a common enemy India if directly threatened
– most of these competing interests have by design or default perfect the art of Salami Tactics where by they can perpetually lock India in a low intensity conflict
– a hallmark of the Pakistani Art of Salami is the use of non-state actors so agencies of the Pakistani State always have a degree or two of separation
– The Ultimate Shield for this Art of Salami is the Islamic Bomb. Not all of these competing interests need access or control of Nuclear Weapons, the mere fact that they exist gives all of them the necessary strategic cover from an all out Iraq style invasion
– While some of these interests directly threaten the USA none of them affect China directly atleast not to the extent that a Democracy like USA, India or Israel would be affected. Therein lies the next layer of strategic cover from an all out Iraq style invasion for China would never stand for it.
So given these factors what kind of a strategy would be effective against the many competing interests of Pakistan.
Characteristic #1 – It must recognize the many competing interests
– Identify the many power centers
– understand their near term and long term goals
– articulate where their interests should lie
Characteristic #2 – It must never pose a common threat to Unify them
– Never threaten all out war and unify them
– Every step and move must be calibrated to play one against the other
Characteristic #3 – It must seek to isolate the State agencies from the Non-State actors
– Find wedge issues that hold out incentives to one group and costs to the other
Characteristic #4 – It must seek to insulate Chinese interests from the fate of individual groups
– Provide China with a stake in the future of Pakistan
– Ensure Chinese interests are preserved irrespective of which faction ultimately prevails in Pakistan
Characteristic #5 – It must deprive the competing interests the shield of Nuclear Deterrence without directly threatening the nukes
– This is the key characteristic
– As long as that shield exists, Jihadi terror will always find sponsors and safe havens in Pakistan
– But it must be done without physically affecting the status of the Nukes to avoid the risk of an accident or conflict
While these initial thoughts need to be further baked it is increasingly clear that
– an all out threat of invasion similar to Operation Parakram would have the opposite effect of uniting the competing interests and hence is not a viable option
– surgical strikes from across the Indian border on specific targets in the heart of Pakistan would carry the perilous risk of a nuclear misadventure given the insecurities of these competing interests and hence are not a viable option
– a U.S or India lead initiative in the UN Security Council will immediately get identified as anti-Islamic and have the counterproductive effect of uniting the non-state actors and hence that too is not a viable option
Hence the Strategy must not be military and must also not be initiated externally.
Which leads Offstumped’s half baked thinking towards a path that
– it has to precipitate a crisis within Pakistan
– it must pit one competing interest against the other
– it must raise serious doubts about the safety of Pakistan’s Nukes within the competing interests to the point where they dont trust each other but are also scared for their safety
– it must culminate in governing interests within Pakistan calling for external intervention to ensure their very survival
– the external intervention is conditional on the grounds of protecting various interests
– the external intervention becomes semi-permanenet to become the basis for balkanization and containment
[Due to technical issues, Pragmatic Euphony and other blogs on the Indian National Interest have been off-air since today morning. Till the time we restore full service, PE and other INI blogs will continue here at their temporary home.]
Dear Mr. Arun Singh,
Although Indian media’s shrillness on trivial issues betrays the gravity of serious national concerns that they raise with the same stridency, one would have to agree with their alarmist tone today. These are tough times for the Indian state, the country and even though the government might not have officially notified it, the current situation would classify as a national emergency.
May I take this opportunity to recount what you told Shekhar Gupta in an interview a couple of years back–
I draw a distinction between a political emergency and a national emergency. If there is an emergency concerning India I am always available. But as far as politics is concerned, it is best left to those who know it best… I have one regret — that we have not, in respect to our interests, defence and the security of India, attempted to go into any depth in the requirement of change…
It is not only the internal security that is in a mess today. The civil-military relations are strained to a point never witnessed before in this country. The armed forces feel that they have been shoddily treated while the civilian bureaucracy and political masters have formed an impression that the defence services are overreaching their jurisdiction. There is a distinct lack of effort to resolve these tenuous matters of national and internal security — the two are so closely intertwined that it would be pointless to create a dividing line between them.
There were many newsreports yesterday, later disproved by the ensuing events, that the National Security Advisor had also tendered his resignation. If those reports were true, then they would have needed a suitable replacement. You wish to stay away from politics [your view— “politics is basically a game played by politicians largely in self-interest, although the outward excuse or elaboration is always in terms of the nation, the state, the people, especially the poor”] and your wisdom, experience and competence [although you very humbly do not “claim any monopoly on competence or wisdom”] can not be allowed to be frittered away. You are ideally suited to be the National Security Advsior in these troubled times and most countrymen would resonate this plea for you to take over this onerous responsibility.
The despondent and cynical mood among large sections of our society is a poor reflection on the rambling and lackadaisical approach of our leaders today. Your credentials as a “brilliant civilian administrator and planner“, with a passion for and tremendous insight on matters of defence and national security, are unquestioned. Your reports on Defence Expenditure [which is still marked as Secret] and Restructuring National Security [as part of the GoM report after the Kargil Review Committee recommendations] are references for any student of Indian national security; although the major recommendations contained in those reports still await implementation.
At this point in time, allow me to quote two other portions from your interview —
It is lack of leadership. There is no question in my mind that politicians must lead by example, not by consensus, not by discussion.
If the vision is there, the politics will fall into place…
The nation today needs vision and leadership on these matters of grave national importance. The country bemoans lack of effective institutions, but institutions are built by leaders and visionaries. There is no one better suited to junk the archaicystems, procedures, processes and concepts that hold back our national security institutions and replace them with modern institutions suited for a twenty-first century India.
Barring a few short stints as guest lecturers and a couple of years at the South Block for specific tasks, you have stayed in the salubrious climes of Kumaon for nearly 20 years now. My co-bloggers at the INI believe in what they call the Distance from Delhi factor — staying away from the political machinations and power-games in Delhi allows the distant observer to have a rather dispassionate and clearheaded view of the situation. In that sense, you are truly blessed of being in an unique position — of being an insider and an outsider at the same time, trusted by the armed forces and respected by the bureaucrats, the media and the intelligentsia.
In the United States, Barack Obama has set a wonderful example by retaining Robert Gates as his Secretary of Defence. A nation at war needs continuity and India is today a nation at war, engaged in fighting an asymmetric war. The nation goes to polls in another five months time and the electoral politics is going to render the gravitative issues of national security and internal security ineffectual and inefficacious. You are a bipartisan person who has worked with most of the Congress leaders in your earlier stint as a minister and also worked alongside most top BJP leaders during your assignment with the NDA government. If both the political formations agree to your candidature for the National Security Advisor, then you are ideally suited to continue into the next administration and provide continuity on matters of national and internal security. That is what this nation needs in these times of political acrimony.
I do not know whether Dr. Manmohan Singh has the wisdom and the boldness of vision to pick up the telephone and place a call to you in Binsar (near Almora). However Mr. Advani and Mr. Jaswant Singh could probably take this opportunity to advise the Prime Minister to initiate that telephone call. That would be truly an act of political unity in national interest and not merely a symbolic one.
I hope that you will respond favourably to that telephone call, if and when it comes, and the advantages of “hindsight, age, greater wisdom and more experience” will allow you to steer the nation through these turbulent waters.
Yours sincerely etc.